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Deontic commitments in conditional promises and threats: towards an exemplar 
semantics for conditionals 
Magdalena Sztencel 
Leesa Clarke 
Abstract  
This paper studies two types of cognitive factors which have been assumed to underpin people’s 
interpretation of conditional promises and threats: logic and socio-cognitive assumptions about what 
conditional promisors and threateners are obliged and permitted to do. We consider whether the logic 
of conditionals is compatible with the socio-cognitive assumptions underlying their interpretation or 
whether the two come apart. From the classical logical accounts of conditionals, almost all modern 
theories have inherited a constraint which specifies that a conditional cannot be true if its antecedent 
is true and consequent false. This logical constraint is widely assumed to constitute, at least partially, 
a conditional’s semantics, or ‘core meaning’. A replication of Beller et al.’s (2005) study, reported in 
this paper, calls for revisiting this long-standing, cross-theoretically assumed constraint. As 
predicted, we have found that, in English, conditional promises are generally consistent with this 
logical constraint, but threats are not. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of a new 
usage-based category of conditional threats, and support the claim that the observed logical 
asymmetry in the interpretation of conditional promises versus threats is just an epiphenomenon of a 
socio-cognitive symmetry which pertains to people’s assumptions about the deontic commitments of 
both conditional promisors and threateners. Based on (i) the observed lack of uniform application of 
the logical constraint and (ii) a consideration of individual variation in the interpretation of 
conditional promises and threats, we argue that an exemplar approach to conditionals is a plausible 
option. 
Keywords: conditional promises, conditional threats, inducements, deontic commitments, the better 
person possibility threats, exemplar semantics 
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1. Introduction  
Promises and threats play a central role in human communication, from family life to negotiation and 
politics. They are often formulated as conditionals:  
(1) If you do the dishes, I'll let you go out. 
(2) If you don’t eat the dinner, I won’t buy you this toy.  
Comprehension of conditional promises and threats has been studied in psychology, linguistics and 
philosophy. However, there has been little agreement as to what exactly the encoded semantics of 
conditional sentences is.  
 In grammatical terms, conditionals are complex sentences which consist of an if-clause, often 
referred to as the antecedent, and the main clause, which is also known as the consequent. In terms of 
their semantics, conditionals have been traditionally (i.e. following Grice 1989) assumed to encode 
the logical, truth-functional operator of Material Implication (henceforth, MI). This approach is 
justified insofar as it allows making some interesting predictions about what speakers are committing 
themselves to when they use conditionals. 
 The logical operator MI is typically represented by means of a truth table, where the variable 
p stands for the antecedent, q for the consequent and the horseshoe symbol ‘’ represents MI (other 
symbols used in the paper are: ‘&’ for conjunction and ‘~’ for negation). In the truth table and 
throughout the paper, T stands for ‘true’ and F for ‘false’. 
Table 1. The truth table of Material Implication (T=true, F=false) 
 p q pq 
1. T T T 
2. T F F 
3. F T T 
4. F F T 
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Let us now look at the predictions that MI makes for a conditional promise like that in (1), repeated 
below for convenience. 
(1) If you do the dishes, I'll let you go out. 
In the first line of the truth table, pq is T in a situation in which p is T and q is T. Applying this to 
our example, the conditional in (1) would be T – i.e. the speaker would have spoken truly – in a 
situation in which the speaker lets the hearer go out (q is T) after the hearer has done the dishes (p is 
T). It is worth noticing that this situation (or such a combination of truth values for p and q) 
corresponds to an intuitive understanding of what it means for the speaker of (1) to keep the terms of 
the conditional promise she made (the pronoun ‘she’ is used to refer to the speaker and ‘he’ to the 
hearer, unless specified otherwise in our examples).  
Moving on to line two of Table 1, here the speaker has spoken falsely (as pq is F), which 
corresponds to a situation in which the hearer does the dishes (p is T) and the speaker does not let 
him go out (q is F). Note the further predictive power of MI here: line two formally excludes the 
possibility of a true conditional where p is T and q is F – i.e. it excludes (p & ~q) – and, interestingly, 
this truth value combination corresponds to an intuitive understanding of what would count as 
breaking the terms of a conditional promise by the speaker.   
Line 3 may initially seem counterintuitive as here MI predicts a situation in which a truthful 
promisor (pq is T) is over-generous in that she lets the hearer go out (q is T) even though the hearer 
hasn’t done the dishes (p is F). However, on reflection, the speaker of (1) only said what she will do 
in a situation in which the hearer does the dishes, i.e. in which the hearer makes p true (henceforth, 
makes p). Thus, it may be argued that, in uttering (1), the speaker has not committed herself to any 
action in a situation in which the hearer doesn’t do the dishes, i.e. in which the hearer makes p false 
(henceforth, makes p). The predictions on line 4 are straightforward: a truthful promisor (pq is T) 
has the option of not letting the hearer go out, i.e. of making q (because q is F) in a situation in 
which the hearer hasn’t done the dishes, i.e. made p (because p is F).  
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MI licences two inferences. The first of these, Modus Ponens, follows from the combination 
of lines 1 and 2 in the truth table and states that if the conditional is T and p is T, q must also be T. 
This can be expressed using the following logical notation: ((pq) & p)  q. Applying this to our 
example, if the speaker of (1) has spoken truly (pq) and the hearer has done the dishes (p), it is 
certain that the speaker will let the hearer go out (q), all other things being equal. 
The second inference, Modus Tollens, follows from the combination of lines 2 and 4 and 
states that if the conditional is T and q is F, p must be F: ((pq) & q)  p. In example (1), this 
means that if the speaker has spoken truly (pq) and the hearer hasn’t been allowed to go out (q), 
we can be certain that the hearer has not done the dishes (p), all other things being equal. 
According to the truth-functional approach, Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens follow 
semantically – i.e. independently of context – from a conditional statement. Nothing else follows 
semantically. For example, we have already seen that in (1) the speaker is semantically permitted to 
let the hearer go out (to make q) regardless of whether the hearer does the dishes or not. Hence, 
according to the logic of MI, one cannot infer with certainty that a truthful speaker of (1) will refrain 
from letting the hearer go out (make q) in a situation in which the hearer hasn’t done the dishes (has 
made p). Such inference, called the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent – formally, ((pq) & p)  
q – is not licensed by MI. Neither is the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent – formally, ((pq) & 
q)  p – which would allow one to infer with certainty that the hearer has done the dishes (made p) 
based on the information that a truthful speaker of (1) has let the hearer go out (has made q).   
Nevertheless, people often embark on these two fallacious inferences. They do so when they 
interpret the utterance of a conditional “if p, q” as a biconditional “if and only if p, q”. For example, 
the hearer of (1) may believe that he will be let out by the speaker if and only if he does the dishes; 
that is, if he doesn’t do the dishes, the speaker will not let him go out. Standard approaches assume 
that when people interpret if as if and only if, they do so via a pragmatic, context-dependent process 
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of biconditionalisation (Grice 1989; Comrie 1986; Levinson 1983; Smith and Smith 1988; van der 
Auwera 1997; Horn 2000; Noh 2000).  
The traditional truth-functional approaches have enjoyed relative popularity in post-Gricean 
linguistics (e.g. Comrie 1986; Smith & Smith 1988; Noh 2000) and in some main theoretical 
approaches in the psychology of reasoning (e.g. Rips 1994; Braine & O’Brien 1998). Philosophers 
generally agree that conditionals cannot be semantically modelled on MI (e.g. Adams 1965, 
Stalnaker 1975, Edgington 1995, Lycan 2001), a position in which they are joined by some 
psychologists (e.g. Oaksford & Chater 2003; Evans & Over 2004; Evans et al. 2007) and linguists 
(e.g. van der Auwera 1997; Sweetser 1990: 113-141). There are also approaches (e.g. Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne 2002; Johnson-Laird et al. 2009) positing what looks like an MI-based analysis of the ‘core 
meaning’ of a conditional – one which includes the three possibilities licensed by MI (p & q, p & q, 
p & q) and excludes the possibility of p & q – whose proponents, however, explicitly state that 
their theory is not truth-functional (Johnson-Laird et al. 2009: 75).  
Now, regardless of the issue of truth-functional commitments, it appears that all theories of 
conditionals – including the co-called sufficient conditionality approach developed within cognitive 
linguistics (e.g. Sweetser 1990: 113-141) –  share the view that the possibility of (p & q) should be 
excluded from the theory of conditionals. This cross-theoretical view is succinctly summed up by 
Lycan (2001: 24), who points out that ‘it is natural to be squeamish about a theory of conditionals 
that allows a conditional to be true even though its antecedent is true and its consequent is false.’ 
Following Sztencel (2018), we are going to refer to this cross-theoretical constraint on conditionals 
as the (p & q) constraint (‘it is not the case that p and not q’ constraint). The question that we are 
interested in is whether the (p & q) constraint really is some sort of unitary constraint on the 
interpretation of “if p, q” conditionals, one which could be considered to constitute the context-
independent semantics of conditionals. The current paper deals with this question by looking at 
conditional promises and threats.   
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In recent years, there has been a series of experiments in social psychology which report on a 
promise versus threat asymmetry in establishing when a conditional promise versus a conditional 
threat count as false (Beller 2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch 2005; Beller & Bender 2004; 
Beller, Bender & Song 2009). The authors’ deontic commitment and emotional level analysis 
uncovers systematic differences in how conditional promises versus threats are interpreted. In 
particular, these studies found that breaking the terms of a conditional promise corresponds to (p & 
q), which is predicted by the logic of MI, whereas breaking the terms of a conditional threat 
corresponds to (p & q), which is not predicted by MI. Relatedly, the authors have found that the 
conditional threatener is not obliged to make q in a situation in which the hearer made p (see also 
Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Verbrugge et al. 2004, 2005). This is important since a lack of 
obligation to (p & q) entails permission to (p & q), which is inconsistent with MI or, more 
generally, with the (p & q) constraint. Now, Beller (2002) and Beller, Bender and Kuhnmünch 
(2005) concur with Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (2002) MI-based analysis of the ‘core meaning’ of a 
conditional. The authors argue that their findings are consistent with this theory and that their 
account explains how the ‘core meaning’ of a conditional – i.e. meaning which excludes the 
possibility of (p & q) – is modulated in use.   
The aim of the current paper is twofold. Firstly, Beller et al.’s studies were carried out in 
German (Beller 2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch 2005), Tongan (Beller & Bender 2004) and 
Mandarin Chinese (Beller, Bender & Song 2009). We want to strengthen the cross-linguistic validity 
of the results by replicating the study on English conditionals. Secondly, we want to extend the 
previous studies by considering the aforementioned asymmetry between conditional promises and 
threats with regard to the cross-theoretically assumed (p & q) constraint.  
If it is found that the (p & q) constraint does not apply to all conditionals, then the question 
arises whether it can actually be thought of as constituting the core meaning, or schematic 
representation, of conditionals. We will consider this question in relation to exemplar semantics.    
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2. Beller’s Deontic Commitments Hypothesis  
Examples (1) and (2), repeated below for convenience, exemplify two types of conditional 
inducements, i.e. statements made to influence hearers’ behaviour by telling them about the 
consequences of their behaviour (Searle 1971).  
(1) If you do the dishes, I'll let you go out. 
(2) If you don’t eat the dinner, I won’t buy you this toy.    
(1) is used to influence the hearer’s behaviour by promising that q (I'll let you go out) will be true if p 
(you do the dishes) is true, and (2) is used to influence the hearer’s behaviour by threatening that q (I 
won’t buy you this toy) will be true if p (you don’t eat the dinner) is true. As is well-known from the 
literature (e.g. Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Fillenbaum 1986; Beller 2002), there is a motivational-
level difference between conditional promises and threats: whereas with promises, p is a desired 
behaviour for which there is a reward (q), with threats, p is an undesired behaviour for which there is 
a punishment (q). Thus with promises the hearer is motivated (and thus expected) to make p, whereas 
with threats the hearer is motivated (and thus expected) to make ~p. As pointed out by Beller (2002), 
this difference at the motivational level gives rise to a difference in deontic commitments.   
Beller (2002) argues that crucial to the interpretation of conditional inducements is the 
question of what the speaker is obliged to do and what the speaker is permitted to do when p is false 
(i.e. when ~p is the case). With promises, a cooperative hearer is one who makes p (does the dishes). 
When the hearer cooperates, the speaker is obliged to make q (let the hearer go out). From this it 
follows that the speaker is not permitted to make ~q (refrain from letting the hearer go out) – this is 
because making ~q would amount to breaking the terms of the conditional promise. With threats, 
however, a cooperative hearer is one who makes ~p (eats the dinner). When the hearer cooperates, 
the speaker is obliged to make ~q (buy the hearer the toy). From this it follows that the speaker is not 
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permitted to make q (refrain from buying the hearer the toy) as this would amount to breaking the 
terms of the conditional threat.  
But what if the hearer doesn’t cooperate? With promises, an uncooperative hearer is one who 
makes ~p (doesn’t do the dishes). When the hearer doesn’t cooperate, then, according to Beller, there 
is no obligation on the speaker to reward the hearer with q (letting the hearer go out), yet she is 
permitted to do so. With threats, on the other hand, an uncooperative hearer is one who makes p 
(doesn’t eat the dinner). Beller (2002) argues that, when the hearer doesn’t cooperate, the speaker is 
permitted to make q (refrain from buying the hearer the toy), but, at least intuitively, it is not clear 
whether the speaker is obliged to make q in such a scenario. This last point is important. If the 
speaker is not obliged to make q in a situation in which the hearer made p, then she is permitted to 
make ~q. If the speaker is permitted to make ~q, then the question arises of whether the speaker of a 
conditional threat is committed to (p & q) in the first place. 
The predictions of Beller’s deontic commitments hypothesis delineate our main research 
questions in this project. Is there any evidence that not keeping a conditional promise in English 
corresponds to (p & q), whereas not keeping a conditional threat to (p & q)? Relatedly, is it really 
the case that the speaker of a conditional threat is permitted to make ~q in a situation in which the 
hearer made p? And, finally, what consequences do answers to these questions have for the 
assumption that the (p & q) constraint applies uniformly to all “if p, q” conditionals?  
 
2.1. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
Beller’s (2002) original study was designed to test predictions for the interpretation of conditional 
threats and promises at five levels of analysis: motivational, linguistic, deontic, pragmatic and 
emotional. Following Beller (2002), the levels are defined as follows. 
 The motivational level has to do with the speaker’s expectations as to what the hearer would 
do in the normal course of action, i.e. if not induced (see also Fillenbaum 1977; Evans & Twyman-
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Musgrove 1998). The speaker’s expectation that the hearer would not make p for promises or p for 
threats of his own accord results in the utterance of a conditional inducement and concurrent offering 
of an incentive to motivate the hearer’s behaviour (q for promises and q for threats). The speaker’s 
expectations and incentives reflect her desire for the hearer’s goal-orientated behaviour (behaviour 
with a purpose of getting a reward or avoiding a punishment). It is predicted that the hearer’s goal-
orientated behaviour should temporally precede the implementation of the incentive. Otherwise, the 
speaker risks that what was intended as an incentive will not motivate the desired hearer’s behaviour.  
 The linguistic level, as defined by Beller (2002), has to do with how a conditional inducement 
is formulated. In line with the motivational level predictions, the linguistic formulation in which the 
information about the desired hearer’s behaviour temporally/linearly precedes the information about 
the incentive (as in (1) and (2) above) should be chosen most often. Such formulation, which 
corresponds to “if p, then q” is referred to as canonical. Furthermore, it follows from the 
motivational level analysis that the information about the desired hearer’s behaviour would not 
appear in the formulation of an inducement if it was not intended to be a condition on the 
implementation of the incentive. Thus, according to Beller (and consistently with Geis & Zwicky 
1971, but see von Fintel 2001), the hearers of conditional inducements should readily embark on the 
inference of Denying the Antecedent and chose a complementary formulation of an inducement, i.e. 
“if p, then q”, as representing such an inference (If you don’t do the dishes, I won’t let you go out; 
If you eat the dinner, I will buy you this toy). Now, it transpires that conditional promises can also be 
formulated using a reversed form of “if q, then p” (If I let you go out, then you’ll do the dishes). 
However, the reversed formulation seems inappropriate for conditional threats (?If I don’t buy you 
this toy, then you won’t eat the dinner). Conversely, conditional threats can be formulated using a 
reversed-complementary form of “if q, then p” (If I buy you this toy, then you’ll eat the dinner), 
but promises cannot (?If I don’t let you go out, then you won’t do the dishes). Nevertheless, the 
reversed formulation for promises and the reversed-complementary formulation for threats should 
Language & Cognition 10 (2018) 
https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2018.10 
11 
 
not be chosen very often as the reversal of the temporal/linear order means that the desired hearer’s 
behaviour is no longer under the speaker’s control.  
 The analysis at the deontic level deals with the predictions of the deontic commitment 
hypothesis as discussed earlier. The pragmatic level, as specified by Beller, is concerned with the 
actions which are undertaken following the utterance of an inducement. Linked to the temporal/linear 
order discussed above is the prediction that the hearer decides first whether to cooperate with the 
speaker or not. After this, the speaker is in position to decide whether to cooperate with the hearer. 
Finally, the emotional level deals with emotional reactions which are elicited by goal-congruent 
versus goal-incongruent events (e.g. Roseman et al. 1996). From the perspective of the hearer of a 
conditional inducement, a goal-congruent event corresponds to the hearer getting a reward or 
avoiding a punishment as a result of performing the action desired by the speaker. A goal-
incongruent event is when the hearer does not get a reward or receives a punishment despite 
performing the action desired by the speaker. Accordingly, hearers are predicted to feel joy when 
they receive a deserved reward, relief when a negative event – such as punishment – does not happen 
and anger when the speaker does not cooperate in a situation in which the hearer has cooperated by 
performing the action desired by the speaker. Thus, the hearer’s emotional reaction to the events that 
have occurred allows detecting whether the speaker has kept or broken the terms of their conditional 
inducement.  
 We tested the predictions of this multi-level analysis in two parts of the experiment, which 
are described in the next section. 
 
3. The Replication  
3.1. PARTICIPANTS 
70 students took part in the experiment. The students came from different disciplines (e.g. literature, 
history, theology, education, sports sciences, business studies) at York St John University, UK. 34 
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students were male and 36 female, with a mean age 20.14 years (range: 18-32). They all indicated 
that English was their first language.  
 
3.2. MATERIALS  
For the current study, the instrument used in the German studies by Beller (2002) and Beller et al. 
(2005) was translated into English. The emotional analysis was simplified (as in Beller 2002) to 
include two situations - mutual cooperation and unexpected non-cooperation. The extended analysis 
of mutual non-cooperation and unexpected cooperation was not included because the emotional 
analysis was not the main focus of the current paper. We had to make several translation decisions 
that need to be explained here. The first decision concerned the translation of the emotions. The 
German emotion adjectives were translated into English in the following way: erleichtert (relieved), 
erfreut (happy), beschämt (ashamed), traurig (sad), gelangweilt (bored), ärgerlich (annoyed) and 
ängstlich (anxious). We used the Berlin Affective Word List Reloaded (Võ et al. 2009) to examine 
the affective valence and arousal ratings of the German emotion expressions. The German word 
Ärger1, which can be translated into English as annoyance or anger, is rated for affective valence at -
1.9 on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘very negative’ -3 to ‘very positive’ 3 and for arousal at 3.94 on a 
5-point scale ranging from ‘low’ 1 to ‘high’ 5 (Võ et al. 2009). For the English expressions, we used 
Bradley and Lang’s (1999) 9-point scale. The English translations have the following ratings: angry 
(valence 2.85, arousal 7.17), annoyed (valence 2.74, arousal 6.49). This suggests that annoyed 
matches Ärger better on valence and arousal than angry does; however, the ratings of annoyed are 
nevertheless slightly higher (by 2-3%) than the ratings for Ärger. Accordingly, we decided to 
translate ärgerlich as annoyed, rather than angry. 
                                                          
1 We looked at Ärger as there are no ratings for ärgerlich in the Berlin Affective Word List - Reloaded 
(BAWL-R). Beller et al. (2005) use the word angry/anger to report the results for ärgerlich. For consistency 
and readability, we use the word annoyed to report their results for ärgerlich. 
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The second decision concerned the use of modal verbs for the obligation (must, doesn’t have 
to) and permission (may, must not) questions in the second part of the experiment. Due to the 
epistemic/deontic ambiguity pertaining especially to the modals doesn’t have to and may in our 
scenarios, we decided to use the modal verbs in the options (e.g. Peter doesn’t have to lend Claire his 
computer game; Peter may lend Claire his computer game) but use the modal expressions obliged 
and permitted in the questions (i.e. Is Peter obliged to lend Claire his computer game?; Is Peter 
permitted to lend Claire his computer game?). This, we believe, has minimised the risk of the 
epistemic interpretation. Additionally, there was a ‘Please explain your choice’ section after each of 
the deontic tasks, which allowed identifying any issues with ambiguity and also potential issues with 
the strength of the modals.  
 The questionnaire consisted of two parts, Part I and Part II. 
3.2.1. Part I 
In Part I, conditional inducements were embedded in scenarios of mutual exchange. The characters 
try to achieve their goals by either making a promise (If you lend me your bike, then I’ll help you 
with your homework; If you help me with my homework, then I’ll lend you my bike) or making a 
threat (If you do not lend me your bike, then I will not help you with your homework; If you do not 
help me with my homework, then I will not lend you my bike). In half of the questionnaires, Henry 
was the speaker and Frank the hearer; in the other half, the roles were reversed. Each scenario was 
followed by four tasks: formulation, inference, sequence and emotions. 
In the formulation task, the participants were provided with one of the mutual exchange 
scenarios, like the one below, and told which inducement type (promise or threat) the speaker will 
use.   
Usually, Frank doesn’t lend his bike to his schoolmates. However, Henry wants to borrow it today. 
Henry tries to reach this goal by promising Frank something. Henry knows that Frank would like his 
help with today’s homework, but usually Henry doesn’t help him. 
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The participants were then presented with four conditionals (canonical, complementary, reversed and 
reversed-complementary) and instructed to select the one that seemed ‘the best choice’ for the 
speaker’s intended inducement.  
Beginning from the inference task, the participants were given the context stories along with 
the canonical conditional, as in the example below.  
Henry promised: 
“Frank, if you lend me your bike, then I will help you with your homework.” 
The instructions asked participants to choose ‘the most probable’ conclusion that could be made 
based on the given conditional. The participants were choosing between three options: 
complementary, reversed and reversed-complementary.  
In the sequence task, the participants were instructed to decide on the order of actions that 
will follow once the conditional inducement has been made.  
In the emotion task a conditional inducement was given in a context story and the task 
mentioned that the hearer co-operated (made p for promises, made ~p for threats), as in the example 
below. 
Henry promised: “Frank, if you lend me your bike, then I will help you with your homework.” After 
that, Frank lent his bike to Henry. 
Informants were then to decide: 
- what the speaker does (makes q or makes ~q) if he acts versus doesn’t act according to 
the terms of the given inducement; and  
- which feeling the hearer will have towards the speaker (relieved, happy, annoyed, 
ashamed, sad, bored or anxious) 
The tasks were ordered as described above. However, as the answers to inference task could 
potentially influence the answers to sequence task, the order of these two tasks was varied to avoid 
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order effects (see Beller et al. 2005). The formulation task, inference task, sequence task and emotion 
task (the last of which had four sub-sections) were each presented on a separate page.  
 
3.2.2. Part II 
In Part II, there were also four scenarios. This time they differed with respect to the speech act 
variable (promise or threat) and content variable (mutual lending or mutual destruction). Part II was 
devised to elicit deontic inferences about what the speaker is obliged and permitted to do in a 
situation where the hearer cooperated and in a situation where the hearer did not cooperate. Of 
particular interest here was the question of whether the findings from Part I could be replicated in a 
different set of tasks and extended to include the conditional threatener’s deontic commitments in a 
situation in which the hearer didn’t cooperate. This last point will help us establish whether (p & ~q) 
is permitted for conditional threats in English. 
In this part, conditional threats and promises were embedded in context stories constructed 
from two different content scenarios: mutual lending of things and mutual destruction of toys 
(amounting to four context stories).   
Mutual lending scenarios stated that Peter would like to borrow Claire’s comic book: 
- Peter’s threat: If you do not lend me your comic book, then I will not lend you my computer 
game  
- Peter’s promise: If you lend me your comic book, then I’ll lend you my computer game 
Mutual destruction scenarios stated that Sarah is about to smash George’s Lego car. George would 
like to prevent Sarah from smashing his car and he knows that Sarah has set up her Playmobil farm.  
- George’s threat: If you smash my car, then I will smash your farm 
- George’s promise: If you do not smash my car, then I will not smash your farm 
Each context story was followed by four tasks: two for a situation in which the hearer cooperated, 
and two for a situation in which the hearer did not cooperate. An example is presented below. 
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Peter threatens Claire: “If you don’t lend me your comic book, I will not lend you my computer 
game.”  
Following Peter’s threat, Claire lends Peter her comic book. What applies in this situation? 
 
1. Is Peter obliged to lend Claire his computer game? Choose only one of the options: 
a) Peter must lend Claire his computer game 
b) Peter doesn’t have to lend Claire his computer game 
c) It cannot be decided  
The mutual lending and mutual destruction scenarios were set to ask different questions: whether the 
speaker is obliged/permitted to cooperate (lend the computer game) and whether the speaker is 
obliged/permitted not to cooperate (smash the Playmobil farm) respectively, each for the cooperative 
hearer and the non-cooperative hearer scenarios. These questions allowed us to obtain data on: 
- Obligation and permission to keep the terms of a given inducement, which amounts to (p & 
q) for promises and (p & q) for threats 
- Obligation and permission to break the terms of an inducement, which amounts to (p & q) 
for promises and (p & q) for threats  
- Obligation and permission to be the better person (where X is the better person if X does Y a 
good turn even though Y hasn’t done X a good turn), which amounts to (p & q) for promises 
and (p & q) for threats 
- Obligation and permission to follow through with negative consequences of one’s 
inducement, which amounts to (p & q) for promises and (p & q) for threats 
In Part II, tasks 1 and 2 were presented on one page as they shared the same scenario. The same 
obtained for tasks 3 and 4. The participants were instructed to work on the tasks in the given order, 
not to return to a previous question and to take as much time as they needed. All materials were 
presented in English.   
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3.3. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
There were four experimental groups corresponding to four different scenarios. The four scenarios 
varied between groups and the speech acts were balanced between parts of the questionnaire. In 
assigning participants to groups, we controlled for the degree they were studying for (humanities 
versus non-humanities) and gender.  
The questionnaire was administered in a teaching room on several days during a two-week 
period. Some participants were recruited via an email invitation; others were recruited on-the-spot on 
campus. The participants received a voucher as an incentive. All participants were asked not to 
discuss the study with anyone until the end of the two-week period. After a general introduction 
page, four tasks of Part I were followed by four tasks of Part II.  
 
3.4. RESULTS  
3.4.1. Part I  
Formulation task. The results for the formulation task are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. Results of the formulation task: choice of conditional formulation by type of inducement 
 
 Canonical 
 
Complementary Reversed 
 
Reversed- 
complementary 
Total 
Promise Count (%) 31 (86.1%) 0 (0%) 4 (11.1%) 1 (2.8%) 36 (100%) 
Threat Count (%) 21 (61.8%) 8 (23.5%) 0 (0%) 5 (14.7%) 34 (100%) 
 
The results indicate that there is a significant association between the type of inducement used and 
whether the person chose a canonical formulation or not. 31 out of 36 (86.1%) of the participants 
within the promise scenario chose the canonical formulation over the total of other possibilities, 
p<.001, binomial distribution with N=36 and r=1/4. However, only 21 out of 34 (61.8%) of the 
participants within the threat scenario chose the canonical formulation over the total of the other 
possibilities, p=.23, binomial distribution with N=34 and r=1/4. A χ2 test of this difference between 
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the promise versus threat formulation preferences was significant, χ2 (1, N=70)=5.43, p=.028. The 
effect size was medium with phi=.278. Out of the other possibilities, reformulating a conditional 
threat as its complementary promise was more frequent than the reversed-complementary conditional 
option. For promises, the reversed formulation was chosen 4 times.   
Inference task. The results for the inference task are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Results of the inference task: choice of ‘the most probable’ conclusion by type of 
inducement 
 
 
Complementary Reversed 
Reversed- 
complementary 
Total 
Promise Count (%) 28 (77.8%) 4 (11.1%) 4 (11.1%) 36 (100%) 
Threat Count (%) 28 (82.4%) 3 (8.8%) 3 (8.8%) 34 (100%) 
 
Similarly to Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005), we found that promises and threats did not differ 
with respect to choosing the complementary conditional compared to the total of other possibilities, 
χ2 (1, N=70)=.23, p=.768. Aggregated over both speech acts, 56 (80%) of the participants chose the 
complementary conditional, p<.001, binomial distribution with N=70 and r=1/3.   
Sequence task. The predicted action sequence was that the ‘hearer decides first’ whether to 
cooperate with the speaker, after which it will become clear whether the speaker should cooperate. 
Similarly to Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005), the predicted action sequence was chosen by 63 
(87%) of the participants, p<.001, binomial distribution with N=70 and r=1/2.  
Emotion task: Speaker’s action. For promises, a cooperative speaker will make q (help with 
homework or lend bike). 100% informants answered that following the rule of the promise (i.e. acting 
according to the terms of the promise) corresponds to (p & q). For threats, a cooperative speaker will 
make ~q (help with homework or lend bike). 28 out of 33 (84.8%) informants answered that 
following the rule of the threat corresponds to (p & q), p<.001, binomial distribution with N=33 
and r=1/2.   
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For promises, an uncooperative speaker will make ~q (not help with homework or not lend 
bike). 35 out of 36 (97.2%) informants answered that not following the rule of the promise (i.e. not 
acting according to the terms of the promise) corresponds to (p & q), p<.001, binomial distribution 
with N=36 and r=1/2. For threats, an uncooperative speaker will make q (not help with homework or 
not lend bike). 28 out of 34 (82.4%) informants answered that not following the rule of the threat 
corresponds to (p & q), p<.001, binomial distribution with N=34 and r=1/2. 
Emotion task: Hearer’s emotion. In the study conducted by Beller (2002), the speech act 
factor did not contribute significantly to this part of the Emotion task. Aggregated over both speech 
acts, 85.4% of the informants in Beller’s 2002 study said that, if the speaker keeps the rule of the 
inducement, then the hearer will feel a positive emotion and 97.7% of the informants said that the 
hearer will feel a negative emotion if the speaker doesn’t keep the rule. However, in Beller et al.’s 
2005 study, the speech act factor was found to contribute significantly where the speaker cooperated 
(χ2 (2, N=67)=15.36, p<.001). Beller et al. (2005) report that whereas the hearer was said to feel a 
negative emotion if the speaker didn’t keep the rule 100% of the time (aggregated over both speech 
acts) and a positive emotion if the speaker kept the rule 80.6% of the time (aggregated over both 
speech acts), 24.2% of the informants in the threat scenario indicated that the hearer feels annoyed 
even if the speaker cooperated.  
In our study, the speech act factor was found to contribute significantly in both situations: 
where the speaker followed and didn’t follow the rule of the inducement. The results are summarised 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Results of the emotion task, hearer’s emotion: choice of positive or negative emotion by 
inducement type and whether the speaker followed or didn’t follow the rule of the inducement 
 
 Positive 
emotion 
Negative 
emotion 
Total 
Speaker 
followed 
the rule 
Promise      Count (%)                         34 (94.4%) 2 (5.6%) 36 (100%) 
Threat         Count (%)                       17 (51.5%) 16 (48.5%) 33 (100%) 
Speaker 
didn’t 
follow the 
rule 
Promise       Count (%)             0 (0%) 36 (100%) 36 (100%) 
Threat         Count (%) 8 (23.5%) 26 (76.5%) 34 (100%) 
 
The variable Emotion was classified into two categories: positive and negative. Feeling ‘relieved’ or 
‘happy’ was counted as having a positive emotion, whereas feeling ‘ashamed’, ‘sad’, ‘bored’, 
‘annoyed’ or ‘anxious’ counted as having a negative emotion. With promises, if the speaker acts 
according to the terms of the inducement, the hearer is said to feel a positive emotion by 34 out of 36 
(94.4%) of the participants. With threats, if the speaker acts according to the terms of the 
inducement, the hearer is said to feel a positive emotion by only 17 of the 33 (51.5%) participants. A 
χ2 analysis reveals that this difference is significant, χ2 (1, N=69)=16.46, p<.001. The effect size is 
medium with phi=.488.  
Looking at the emotions in more detail, following the rule of the promise by the speaker 
resulted predominantly in the hearer feeling happy (55.6%) or relieved (38.8%). As for the negative 
emotions, 45.5% of our informants chose ‘annoyed’ in a situation where the speaker followed the 
rule of the threat. This number is higher than 15% (Beller 2002) or 24.2% (Beller et al. 2005) of the 
German participants who chose ‘annoyed’ in this situation.  
Moving on to the uncooperative speaker scenarios, with promises, the hearer is said to feel a 
negative emotion 100% of the time, 88.9% of which is comprised by ‘annoyed’ (comparable to 
Beller 2002 and Beller et al. 2005). With threats, the hearer is said to feel a negative emotion by 26 
out of 34 participants (76.5%) in our study, p<.003, binomial distribution with N=34 and r=5/7. 
Looking at the negative emotions in more detail, 52.9% of the participants in our study said that the 
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hearer will feel ‘annoyed’ and 23.6% said that the hearer will feel ‘sad’. In the German studies, 
feeling ‘annoyed’ was chosen more often than the overall number for negative emotions in our study: 
by over 90% of participants in Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005). 
3.4.2. Part II 
The χ2 test revealed that the speech act factor (promise or threat) did not contribute signiﬁcantly to 
any of the tasks (p=0.34). Hence, the data for promise and threat scenarios were aggregated. 2 The 
tasks, which are discussed in detail below, looked into the speakers’ obligation and permission to 
keep the terms of a given inducement, to break the terms of an inducement, to be the better person 
and to follow through with the negative consequences of one’s inducement. In each of the tasks, the 
difference between the most frequent response and the total of the other possibilities was tested with 
a binomial test. The results we significant with p<.05. With the exception of the results for the 
speaker's permission to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement (discussed 
below), our findings are comparable to Beller et. al 2005. 
Hearer cooperated: Speaker’s obligation and permission to keep the terms of the inducement. 
The informants were asked whether the speaker is obliged to keep the terms of the inducement (i.e. 
Peter must lend Claire his computer game) if the hearer cooperated (if Claire lent Peter her comic 
book). For promises, mutual cooperation would correspond to the speaker making q (lend computer 
game) if the hearer makes p (lend comic book) – i.e. (p & q). For threats, that would correspond to 
speaker making ~q (lend computer game) if the hearer makes ~p (lends comic book) – i.e. (~p & ~q). 
69.5% of the people in the mutual lending scenario indicated that the speaker is obliged to cooperate 
(lend out his computer game) if the hearer cooperated (lent out her comic book), 25% of the 
                                                          
2 Following Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005), the destruction scenario data on the speaker's obligation/permission to 
smash the farm was recoded into the speaker's lack of permission/obligation to refrain from smashing the farm (similarly 
for the lending scenario). The findings from the recoded analysis did not show any significantly different results to those 
obtained from the direct data, therefore the recoded data was not included in the remainder of the analysis.   
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informants indicated that there is no obligation for the speaker to cooperate if the hearer cooperated 
and 5.5% were undecided.  
As for permission to keep the terms of the inducement, 82.8% of the participants indicated 
that the speaker is permitted to keep the terms of the inducement, 14.3% indicated it cannot be 
decided and 2.9% indicated that the speaker is not permitted to keep the terms of the inducement.   
Hearer cooperated: Speaker’s permission and obligation to break the terms of the 
inducement. The informants were asked whether the speaker is permitted to break the terms of the 
inducement (i.e. to destroy Sarah’s farm) in a situation where the hearer cooperated (Sarah didn’t 
destroy George’s car). For promises, lack of cooperation on the part of the speaker corresponds to (p 
& q), whereas for threats to (p & q). 85.3% of the participants in this scenario said that the speaker 
is not permitted to destroy Sarah’s farm, 8.9% said that the speaker is permitted to destroy Sarah’s 
farm and 5.8% said it cannot be decided.  
 As for obligation to break the terms of the inducement, 88.2% of the participants said that 
there is no obligation for the speaker to break the terms of the inducement, whereas 11.8% said it 
cannot be decided.  
Hearer didn’t cooperate: Speaker’s permission and obligation to be the better person. The 
informants were asked whether the speaker is permitted to be the better person, i.e. to lend Claire his 
computer game if Claire didn’t lend Peter her comic book. For promises, the question is about 
whether the speaker is permitted to make q (lend computer game) if the hearer makes ~p (doesn’t 
lend comic book) – i.e. (p & q). For threats, the question is about whether the speaker is permitted 
to make ~q (lend computer game) if the hearer makes p (not lend comic book) – i.e. (p & ~q). 86.1% 
of respondents said that the speaker is permitted to lend his computer game, 11.1% said it cannot be 
decided and 2.8% said the speaker is not permitted to lend his computer game.  
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 As for obligation to be the better person, 88.9% of the respondents said that the speaker is not 
obliged to lend his computer game, 8.3% said that it cannot be decided and 2.8% said the speaker is 
obliged to lend his computer game.   
Hearer didn’t cooperate: Speaker’s obligation and permission to follow through with the 
negative consequences of the inducement. The informants were asked whether the speaker is obliged 
to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement (destroy Sarah’s Playmobil 
farm) if the hearer didn’t cooperate (Sarah destroyed George’s Lego car). For promises, the speaker 
would follow through with the terms of the inducement by making ~q (destroy Playmobil farm) if 
the hearer makes ~p (destroys Lego car) – i.e. (p & q). For threats, that would correspond to 
speaker making q (destroy Playmobil farm) if the hearer makes p (destroy Lego car) – i.e. (p & q). 
70.6% of respondents said that the speaker is not obliged to follow through with the negative 
consequences of the inducement, 23.5% said the speaker is obliged to follow through with the 
negative consequences of the inducement and 5.9% said that it cannot be decided.  
 As for permission, 73.5% of respondents said that the speaker is permitted to follow through 
with the negative consequences of the inducement, 17.7% of people were undecided and 8.8% said 
that the speaker is not permitted to follow through with the negative consequences of the 
inducement. The number for permission is much higher than the 36% of informants who chose this 
option in Beller et al.’s (2005) study. Beller et al. (2005) explain this content effect by reference to an 
implicit social rule that people are not permitted to destroy others’ belongings. 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION 
3.5.1. Part I 
The findings from the formulation task (86.1% canonical promise, 61.8% canonical threat) raise an 
interesting question, which potentially concerns socio-cultural differences in the strategies for 
formulating conditional inducements. We merely point to this issue here, as a meaningful 
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interpretation of the results would require further research. Beller’s studies on German participants 
found no significant difference in the formulation preferences for promises and threats (Beller 2002; 
Beller et al. 2005). However, Beller and Bender’s (2004) study found a significant difference in the 
Tongan participants’ formulation preferences. 64% of Tongan participants chose the canonical 
promise formulation (reversed at 18%, complementary at 12% and reversed-complementary at 6% 
were the other choices), compared to 100% (Beller 2002) and 94% (Beller et al. 2005) of German 
participants; and only 41% of Tongan participants chose the canonical threat formulation 
(complementary at 38% and reversed-complementary at 21% were the other choices), compared to 
90% (Beller 2002) and 85% (Beller et al. 2005) of German participants. Beller and Bender (2004: 
89) argue that because ‘cooperation and particularly sharing with others are core values in the 
Tongan society, threats may simply be not appropriate as a means of initiating an exchange’. 
Looking at our data, the English participants were more likely to choose a canonical threat 
formulation than the Tongan participants, but less likely to do so than the German informants.  
However, caution is needed before we attribute the differences in the formulation task to 
cross-cultural differences. Firstly, Beller and Bender’s (2004) Tongan participants were secondary 
school students with the mean age of 15.4 whereas the German participants were university students 
with the mean age of 23.8 (Beller 2002) and 22.7 (Beller et al. 2005). This opens up the possibility 
that the more mature German students may have been better at putting aside the socio-linguistic 
appropriateness bias whilst engaging in the inducement formulation task: despite their formulation 
choices in the experiment, in real life, they may as well prefer to formulate their threats as promises. 
This hypothesis receives some support from Beller et al.’s (2009) study which investigated the 
responses of secondary school German participants with the mean age of 16.6. This study found that 
only 16% of the participants chose the canonical threat formulation (59% complementary, 22% 
reversed). In our view, the differences in the formulation of conditional inducements require further 
investigation. Nevertheless, the overall results obtained from the Tongan study, Beller et al.’s (2009) 
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German study and the present study reveal an interesting difference. If conditional threats, but not 
promises, are more strongly associated with the complementary formulation, then, potentially, the 
biconditional interpretation is more prominent with this type of inducement.  
The inference task revealed no reliable difference in the most probable inference for 
conditional promises versus threats. However, we do not think that the results give a conclusive 
answer as to the question of whether there are differences in ‘the most probable’ inferential patterns 
associated with conditional promises versus threats. It is known from the literature that people tend 
to make more negative inferences (Modus Tollens and Denying the Antecedent) than positive 
inferences (Modus Ponens and Affirming the Consequent) with threats when compared to promises 
(see Egan & Byrne 2012 for a useful summary). But the design of our inference task did not allow 
making a full comparison; note that we could not compare the rates of the negative inferences we 
obtained (especially the high rates of Denying the Antecedent) with the rates of Modus Ponens 
across the different inducement types, as no formulation corresponding to Modus Ponens was given 
as an option to participants. On the assumption that there is a tendency (as per Geis & Zwicky 1971, 
though see von Fintel 2001) to embark on the inference of Denying the Antecedent, the participants 
will naturally choose this inference as ‘the most probable’ one. An inference acceptance rating task, 
where participants are given the major premise plus the relevant minor premise and are asked 
whether a given conclusion follows, or what conclusion follows, would be better suited to test 
whether there are differences in the most probable inferential patterns associated with promises and 
threats (see e.g. Cummins et al. 1991, Thompson 1994).   
The results of the sequence task confirm the predicted action sequence: the hearer decides 
first whether to cooperate, after which it becomes clear whether the speaker should cooperate. This 
result strengthens the findings from the emotion tasks. 
The results of the Speaker’s action part of the Emotion task support Beller’s (2002) deontic 
commitments hypothesis: breaking the terms of a promise (i.e. promising falsely) tends to 
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correspond to (p & q) whereas breaking the terms of a threat (i.e. falsely threatening) tends to 
correspond to (p & q). This answers the first of our research questions about the deontic 
commitments. As for the second question, Part II deals with the speaker’s deontic commitments in a 
situation in which the hearer didn’t cooperate. But before we turn to this issue, let us look at the 
hearer’s emotional reactions to see whether they support the results obtained in this part.   
There are several interesting findings in the Emotion task. With respect to the hearer’s 
positive emotions in a situation in which the speaker followed the rule of the promise, our overall 
findings are similar to Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005) but differ in that the German participants 
chose ‘relieved’ less frequently than the English participants: 75% ‘happy’ and 25% ‘relieved’ in 
(Beller 2002) and 67% ‘happy’ and 27% ‘relieved’ in (Beller et al. 2005), compared with 55.6% 
‘happy’ and 38.5% ‘relieved’ in the present study. Despite being classified as a positive emotion, the 
more frequent choice of ‘relieved’ among the English participants seems to suggest higher levels of 
anxiety in anticipation of the speaker’s action – typically, one feels ‘relieved’ if some negative event 
that one has been anticipating hasn’t happened. Indeed, these results are consistent with Beller’s 
motivational-level analysis and the resulting predicted action sequence. It follows from the hearer-
first-speaker-second action sequence that once the speaker has uttered the inducement and the hearer 
has fulfilled the speaker’s goal, the hearer has to wait for the speaker to fulfil his goal. Since the 
speaker has the temporal advantage, relief on the part of hearer is plausible to occur for both 
promises and threats.  
As for the finding that 48.5% of the English participants chose a negative emotion when the 
speaker followed the rule of a conditional threat, this kind of emotional choice is likely to stem from 
the fact that the formulation of conditional threats involves the expression of aversive, or 
punishment-maximising, motives rather than appetitive, or reward-maximising motives, as is the 
case with promises (Roseman et al. 1996). So the hearer is judged as feeling a negative emotion 
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because the hearer was forced to participate by a threat (Heilmann & Garner 1975; Beller et al. 
2005). 
Overall, our findings for the hearer’s emotion part of this task support the results obtained for 
the speaker’s action part. If the speaker follows the rule of the inducement, the hearer is said to feel a 
positive emotion and any statistically significant choice of a negative emotion in such a situation is 
dictated by the fact that the hearer was induced by a threat. If the speaker did not follow the rule of 
the inducement, the hearer is said to feel a negative emotion most of the time.  
To summarise, in the first part of the experiment, we have found that (a) conditional threats 
tend to be more strongly associated with the complementary formulation, suggesting that the 
biconditional interpretation, in particular the inference of Denying the Antecedent, may be more 
prominent for this type of a conditional inducement. We have also found that (b) breaking the terms 
of a conditional promise in English is associated with (p & ~q), whereas (c) breaking the terms of a 
conditional threat is associated with (~p & q). These findings were further supported by the results of 
the hearer’s emotion task.  
 
3.5.2. Part II 
Overall, the results obtained for the cooperative hearer scenarios corroborate Beller’s deontic 
commitments hypothesis. When the hearer cooperated, speakers are obliged to keep the terms of the 
inducement (which corresponds to (p & q) for promises and (~p & ~q) for threats) and not permitted 
to break the terms of the inducement (which would correspond to (p & ~q) for promises and (~p & q) 
for threats). These results indicate that threats tend to be strongly associated with (~p & ~q) whereas 
promises with (p & q). 
Given the slightly lower than expected result for the speaker’s obligation to keep the terms of 
the inducement (69.5%), we decided to see whether there was any explanation for it in the qualitative 
data. Interestingly, out of eleven participants who did not give the predicted answer, five participants 
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working in the threat scenario said that the speaker is not obliged to lend Claire his computer game 
because he did not promise that he would. This suggests that these participants did not interpret the 
utterance of a conditional threat as giving rise to the deontic commitments of its complementary 
promise and calls for more research into individual variation in the interpretation of conditional 
inducements. We come back to this point in section 4. 
The results obtained for the uncooperative speaker scenarios also strengthen the findings 
from the previous studies. When the hearer doesn’t cooperate, the speaker is permitted but not 
obliged to be the better person (which corresponds to (~p & q) for promises and (p & ~q) for threats) 
and permitted but not obliged to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement 
(which corresponds to (~p & ~q) for promises and (p & q) for threats). These findings further 
indicate that threats are more strongly associated with (~p & ~q), whereas promises with (p & q).  
In the next section, we discuss our findings – about the speaker’s obligation/permission to 
keep the terms of a given inducement, to break the terms of an inducement, to be the better person 
and to follow through with negative consequences of one’s inducement – in relation to the (p & q) 
constraint.  
 
4. Implications: The (P & Q) Constraint  
Table 5 summarises the findings from Part II which are relevant to the research questions with which 
we have started this project: Is there any evidence that not keeping a conditional promise in English 
corresponds to (p & q), whereas not keeping a conditional threat to (p & q)? What are the 
speaker’s deontic commitments in a situation where the hearer of a conditional threat made p? And, 
finally, what consequences do answers to these questions have for the assumption that the (p & q) 
constraint applies uniformly to all “if p, q” conditionals?  
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Table 5. Summary of Part II findings which are relevant to the discussion of the (p & q) constraint 
(line numbers in the final column are referenced in the discussion in section 4) 
 
 Line  
Keeping terms of 
inducement 
69.5% speaker is obliged to:                 for promise 
                                                                  for threat 
p & q  
p & q 
1 
2 
Breaking terms of 
inducement 
85.3% speaker is not permitted to:        for promise 
                                                                  for threat 
p & q 
p & q 
3 
4 
Being the better 
person  
86.1% speaker is permitted to:             for promise 
                                                                  for threat 
p & q 
p & q 
5 
6 
88.9% speaker is not obliged to:           for promise 
                                                                  for threat  
p & q 
p & q 
7 
8 
Following through 
with negative 
consequences  
70.6% speaker is not obliged to:          for promise 
                                                                  for threat 
p & q 
p & q 
9 
10 
73.5% speaker is permitted to:             for promise 
                                                                  for threat 
p & q 
p & q 
11 
12 
 
As predicted by Beller’s deontic commitments hypothesis, whereas the majority of participants feel 
that the speaker of a conditional threat is obliged to (line 2) make ~q in a situation in which the 
hearer made ~p, the speaker of a conditional promise is typically judged as permitted to (line 11), but 
not obliged to (line 9), make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p. These results show that 
(p & q) is more strongly associated with conditional threats than promises.  
 As for breaking the terms of a conditional inducement, from the threatener’s obligation to 
make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p (line 2), it follows that breaking the terms of a 
conditional threat should correspond to (p & q). Indeed, the majority of participants indicated that 
the conditional threatener is not permitted to make q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p (line 
4). With conditional promises, the majority of participants feel that the conditional promisor is 
obliged to (line 1) make q in a situation in which the hearer made p and, consequently, not permitted 
to (line 3) make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made p. These results indicate that breaking the 
terms of a conditional promise in English is associated with (p & ~q), whereas breaking the terms of 
a conditional threat is associated with (~p & q).  
 With regards to our last question – concerning the conditional threatener’s deontic 
commitments in a situation in which the hearer didn’t cooperate (i.e. made p) – the majority of 
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participants indicated that the conditional threatener is permitted to make ~q in a such situation (line 
6). Crucially, this permission to make ~q in such a situation is equivalent to the lack of obligation to 
(p & q).  
The findings reported in this paper are controversial in the light of the standard, and cross-
theoretical, assumption that the (p & q) constraint applies uniformly to “if p, q” conditionals. 
More generally, the findings are controversial in the light of the traditional theories that require some 
schematised representation, abstracted from past experiences, to be involved in the process of 
utterance interpretation. However, the findings are in line with the theory of illocutionary acts (Searle 
& Vanderveken 1985) and with previous empirical work on languages other than English (Beller 
2002; Beller et al. 2005; Verbrugge et al. 2004, 2005).  
This gives rise to two questions. Firstly, we need to consider whether it is actually possible 
for a threat which does not involve the (p & q) constraint to function as a successful inducement. 
Secondly, assuming a positive answer to the first question, we need to consider which type of 
approach to utterance interpretation is most compatible with the findings. 
 
4.1. WHAT MAKES A SUCCESSFUL INDUCEMENT  
Put simply, the first question amounts to this. Imagine that George threatens Sarah by saying: If you 
smash my Lego car, then I’ll smash your Playmobil farm. Due to the fact that, on multiple occasions 
in the past, George did not follow through with the negative consequences of his threats, Sarah 
assumes that George is actually unlikely to smash her farm in revenge and George knows that Sarah 
assumes so. Given this context, is it possible for George’s threat to induce Sarah to refrain from 
smashing George’s car?  
A threat which does not involve the (p & q) constraint, i.e. one which permits (p & q), 
essentially allows for a situation in which the threatener is the better person – where X is the better 
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person if X does Y a good turn (here: George doesn’t smash Sarah’s farm) even though Y hasn’t 
done X a good turn (here: Sarah smashed George’s car).  
Notice that our results (lines 6 and 8 in Table 5) indicate that even though a conditional 
threatener is permitted to be the better person, they are not obliged to be the better person. Therefore, 
it is plausible to assume that, in a situation in which the hearer of a conditional threat made p (did not 
cooperate), a lack of the (p & q) constraint will keep two possibilities open: the possibility that the 
speaker makes q (is the better person) and the possibility that the speaker makes q (follows through 
with the negative consequences of the inducement). One of the factors which would make such a 
threat a successful inducement then – in fact, one which would make it a threat – is the mere 
possibility of the threatener following through with the negative consequences of the inducement. 
Coming back to our example, even though Sarah assumes that George is unlikely to make q (smash 
her farm), there’s always the possibility that he might behave in an untypical way and this time 
follow through with the negative consequences of his threat. Being aware of this possibility, coupled 
with a desire to prevent it from becoming true, is sufficient to induce Sarah into cooperation. 
As hypothesised by Sztencel (2018), threats which do not involve the (p & q) constraint, 
i.e. threats which can be called ‘the better person possibility threats’, can function as successful 
inducements for two reasons: 
(i) such threats involve the (p & q) constraint; and 
(ii) they involve the possibility of the speaker choosing to (p & q)  
This hypothesis is supported by our findings in the following way. The constraint in (i) is evidenced 
by lines 2 and 4 in Table 5 and it prevents the threatener from breaking the terms of the inducement. 
Thus, assuming that the threatener has spoken truly, this constraint gives the hearer grounds to 
believe that his cooperative behaviour will be met with the speaker’s cooperative behaviour. This 
guarantees that making p will actually be beneficial to the hearer; in other words, (i) provides an 
appetitive motive for the hearer to make p. On top of this, the uncertainty which follows from (ii) – 
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evidenced by lines 6 and 12 taken together – gives the hearer an additional, aversive, motive to make 
p and thus avoid the possibility of the speaker making q.  
Now, if the better person possibility threats can function as successful inducements (in the 
light of (i) and (ii)), then the (p & q) constraint cannot be said to uniformly apply to conditionals. 
A further support for the existence of the better person possibility threats comes from the 
observation that the better person possibility promises also exist. Such promises would involve (i) 
the (p & q) constraint, which ensures that the speaker doesn’t break the terms of the promise 
made, and (ii) the possibility of the speaker choosing to ~q (follow through with the negative 
consequences of the inducement) in a situation in which the hearer didn’t cooperate, i.e. made p 
(Sztencel 2018). The existence of such promises (i.e. promises whose use and interpretation is 
underlain by such assumptions) is evidenced in our findings. When interpreted materially, 
conditional promises involve the hearer’s assumption that the speaker is obliged to cooperate in 
response to the hearer’s cooperative behaviour (lines 1 and 3) and they may involve the assumption 
that the speaker can choose to be the better person (lines 5 and 11)3. The parallel findings for the 
promises and threats are thus mutually supportive of the hypothesis that the better person possibility 
inducements are a real phenomenon.  
 
4.2. TOWARDS AN EXEMPLAR SEMANTICS FOR CONDITIONALS 
Now that we have established that the better person possibility threats can be successful 
inducements, we need to face a possible objection to the argument that the existence of such threats 
undermines the claim that the (p & q) constraint is the ‘core meaning’ of conditionals. It’s 
plausible to imagine an objection along the following lines: any theory which takes the (p & q) 
                                                          
3 We say they may involve this assumption as p is also consistent with the hearer fulfilling an alternative condition on q. 
Whereas in this paper we focus on the better person possibility interpretations, we acknowledge that the study of the 
variability in the application of the (p & q) constraint also needs to involve the alternative antecedents contexts. See 
Sztencel and Duffy (2018) for a discussion of how the assumption of alternative antecedents influences the interpretation 
of conditional advice and inducements.  
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constraint to be the ‘core meaning’, or abstract representation, of a conditional is capable of dealing 
with the findings of this paper – it could be argued that the lack of application of the (p & q) 
constraint is established via a pragmatic inference. But there are several issues with such a 
hypothetical objection.  
The first issue is illustrated by the following example:  
(3) If you do it again, I’ll play the guitar.  
As argued in Sztencel (2014, 2018), (3) can be interpreted as a conditional promise or a threat (see 
also Van Canegem-Ardijns and van Belle 2008; Bonnefon 2009). How it is interpreted depends on 
whether the hearer finds listening to the speaker playing the guitar desirable or not and whether the 
hearer knows that the speaker knows that. So before it is established whether the (p & q) 
constraint applies in this case, it needs to be established whether we are dealing with a promise or a 
threat, which, in turn, depends on the hearer’s assumptions about the speaker’s knowledge of the 
hearer’s likes and dislikes. In other words, it is not the case that the context merely modulates or 
enriches the purportedly encoded abstract representation – in fact, contextual, holistic, inference, 
which involves complex assumptions about one’s interlocutor, leads one to establish that the (p & 
q) constraint applies or that it does not.    
The second issue concerns the explanatory potentials of a logico-semantic approach versus a 
socio-cognitive approach to conditional inducements (Sztencel 2018). One problem for a logico-
semantic approach is that it would have to square the claim that the (p & q) constraint is the ‘core 
meaning’ of conditionals with the issue illustrated by (3) above. Another, very significant, problem is 
that the logico-semantic (p & q) constraint makes different predictions for conditional promises 
and threats with regards to the deontic commitments. Notice that the lack of permission to make q 
when the hearer made p amounts to: 
- for promises, the lack of permission to break the terms of the promise in a situation in 
which the hearer cooperates 
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- for threats, the lack of permission for the speaker to be the better person 
Furthermore, the obligation to (p & q), which follows logically from the (p & q) constraint, 
amounts to: 
- for promises, the obligation for the speaker to keep the terms of the promise in a 
situation in which the hearer cooperates 
- for threats, the obligation for the speaker to follow through with the negative 
consequences of the threat 
Thus, on the logico-semantic approach, the conditional promisor and threatener are semantically 
committed to different things. Crucially, on this approach, the conditional promisor is semantically 
committed to cooperate (i.e. to keep the terms of the inducement) in a situation in which the hearer 
cooperates whereas the conditional threatener isn’t. For a conditional threatener, this commitment 
arises via a pragmatic modulation. So assuming the logical symmetry for all conditionals, in the form 
of the (p & q) constraint, introduces an intuitively incorrect socio-cognitive asymmetry pertaining 
to what rules of cooperation are thought to hold for which inducements. Apart from being intuitively 
incorrect, this socio-cognitive asymmetry is inconsistent with the empirical findings.  
 A more explanatory approach, one which is consistent with the empirical findings reported in 
this paper, would see the observed logical asymmetry (i.e. the lack of across-the-board application of 
the (p & q) constraint) as a mere epiphenomenon of the socio-cognitive symmetry pertaining to 
the deontic commitments of conditional inducers generally. Inducers are obliged to keep the terms of 
the inducements and not permitted to break them; inducers are permitted but not obliged to be the 
better person or to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducements (see Sztencel 
2018 for more details). 
This brings us to the importance of interlocutor-specific memories and their influence on the 
interpretation of conditional inducements. Admittedly, the picture gleaned from our data is a bit 
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simplistic in that it does not tap into individual variation which is likely to pertain to conditional 
threats. Now, in our examples, the majority of participants indicated that the speaker is permitted to 
be the better person. However, research has shown that interlocutor-specific information is one of 
many cues which are simultaneously integrated during language processing and thus may place 
immediate/direct constraints on the processes of utterance production and comprehension (e.g. 
Horton & Gerrig 2005; Horton 2008; Gerrig, Horton & Stent 2011; Horton & Slaten 2012). These 
studies are important for two reasons. First, they show that in utterance interpretation, interlocutor-
specific memories of past experiences are directly compared to the current experience of an utterance 
(in context). This is in keeping with the supporting evidence for exemplar models of categorisation 
coming in from studies of sensory and sensorimotor memories (see Chandler 2017 for the most 
recent review). Second, they predict that we can expect individual – inter speaker and intra speaker – 
variation in the application of the (p & q) constraint in the case of conditional threats. For 
example, if a hearer knows the speaker of a conditional threat well enough to assume with certainty 
that she will follow through with the negative consequences of the threat, such holistic assumptions 
are likely to lead the hearer to infer that the (p & q) constraint is in place. But if the hearer, like 
Sarah from our earlier scenario, assumes that the speaker – George – is unlikely to follow through 
with the negative consequences of the threat (assumptions based on memories of George’s relevant 
past behaviour), then she is likely to infer that the (p & q) constraint is not in place and that 
George’s threat is the better person possibility threat – i.e. that George may or may not retaliate. 
Now, two things have been evident in our discussion so far: specific contextual information, 
which includes assumptions about one’s interlocutors, determines whether the interpretation of a 
conditional inducement is constrained by (p & q); and relatedly, the (p & q) constraint does not 
uniformly, i.e. generally, apply to all conditional inducements. As pointed out by Bybee (2013: 52), 
‘specific information finds a natural expression in an exemplar model, where the storage and 
categorization of all detail both predictable and idiosyncratic is considered to be a basic response to 
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linguistic input.’ Furthermore, Chandler (2017: 81) argues that exemplar models eliminate the need 
to try to identify ‘resident linguistic generalisations’ and fare better to explain categorisation. In 
relation to conditionals specifically, compatible proposals have been made in epistemology. Douven 
(2015), for example, argues that instead of searching for a unitary semantics of if – an approach that 
has so far proven fruitless – the time has come to address conditionals from an epistemological 
perspective (see also Douven 2013; Krzyżanowska et al. 2013; Rescher 2007), a perspective which 
foregrounds the importance of knowledge structures in the comprehension of conditionals.   
Exemplar approaches to semantics are based on exemplar models of categorisation (e.g. 
Hintzman 1986; Nosofsky 1988; Skousen 1989). At the heart of exemplar semantics lies the 
hypothesis that meaning, or rather meaning potential, of words as expression types is no more and no 
less than the collection of token-experiences they are associated with (e.g. Hintzman 1986; Recanati 
1998; Sztencel 2012, 2014, 2018). For example, on Hintzman’s (1986) model, every event to which 
a person attends is stored in long term memory as an individual memory trace. Each memory trace is 
constituted by a configuration of primitive properties (e.g. modality-specific sensory features, simple 
emotional tones, temporal relations, abstract relations) in terms of which experiences are cognised. 
Memory traces are aggregated based on their similarity, which is established by the matching of the 
constitutive primitive properties. Abstract representations do not have a special status and are not 
stored in a functionally separate memory system but can be retrieved on-line from a pool of episodic 
memory traces, or exemplars, and stored as another memory trace (Hintzman 1986; see also Barsalou 
2005). For conditional inducements, this means that any abstractions that may be retrieved on-line 
will be stored in the memory aggregate representing the category of conditional utterances along 
with other, more specific, experience records. We can represent such abstractions using the logical 
notation such as (p & q), (p & q), (p & q), (p & q), etc. 
How would the two approaches – the traditional and exemplar – fare to explain our example 
in which George threatened Sarah that he will smash her farm if she smashes his car, in a context in 
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which it is assumed that George is unlikely to follow through with the negative consequences of his 
threat? On the traditional approach, some specifically linguistic/lexical system would provide the (p 
& q) constraint presumably to aid the process of utterance interpretation. This constraint would then 
have to be dropped/disregarded in response to the context. In contrast to this, the exemplar approach 
(e.g. Hinztman’s 1986) would require us to assume that a mental representation of the acoustic 
properties of George’s utterance (i.e. a mental representation of the utterance’s form) combines with 
Sarah’s assumptions about George (those which are salient to her at the time) to constitute a retrieval 
probe which is sent to all memory traces stored in Sarah’s long-term memory. The traces in Sarah’s 
long-term memory are then activated according to their similarity to the probe – that is, the traces 
which are records of experiences of relevant forms and of George’s past behaviour will be most 
strongly activated. The pattern of most strongly activated properties that resonates back from the 
long-term memory in response to the probe is called the echo. The echo, on the exemplar approach, 
constitutes the meaning of a given utterance. Given the context that we imagined for this scenario, 
the echo is likely to be consistent with the (p & q) but not the (p & q) constraint. Observe 
further that the exemplar semantics’ assumption that all traces are activated in the process of echo 
retrieval is essential to George’s threat functioning as a successful inducement. This is because 
Sarah’s assumption that George may after all behave in a way which is untypical for him must also 
be based on her knowledge that some threateners follow through with the negative consequences of 
their threats and that people do not always behave in predictable ways. It is this wealth of knowledge 
(wealth of records of experiences) that saves Sarah from making an error of inductive reasoning (i.e. 
from assuming that George won’t retaliate because he’s never done so) and makes her act in a way 
wished for by George. 
Admittedly, the above has provided a sketch of how an exemplar account would deal with 
Sarah’s interpretation of George’s threat. Furthermore, there is no space on this occasion to provide a 
more substantial argument for an exemplar semantics approach as opposed to more generally 
Language & Cognition 10 (2018) 
https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2018.10 
38 
 
understood encyclopaedic approaches. But we hope to have shown that it is worth exploring the 
explanatory potential of exemplar models. We would like to argue that there is a real need for 
research into the interaction between (a) the interlocutor-specific information and (b) the inferential 
patterns that lead to the assumption, or otherwise, of the (p & q) constraint to particular uses of “if 
p, q” threats. We believe that, if the deontic commitments of conditional inducers (e.g. Searle & 
Vanderveken 1985; Verbrugge et al. 2004, 2005; Beller et al. 2005) are to be explained, attention 
needs to be refocused from the search for schematic representations of ‘core meaning’ to the direct 
relevance, to utterance interpretation, of stored exemplars.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The results of both parts of the experiment corroborate the predictions of Beller’s deontic 
commitments hypothesis for conditional promises and threats in English. With regards to our specific 
research questions, we have found that breaking the terms of a conditional promise in English is 
associated with (p & ~q), whereas breaking the terms of a conditional threat is associated with (~p & 
q). We also found that (p & ~q) is permitted for conditional threats, which undermines the claim that 
the (p & q) constraint is definitional of the encoded semantics, or ‘core meaning’, of conditionals. 
We have found evidence for a usage category of conditional threats called the better person 
possibility threats and, relatedly, put forward a proposal that an exemplar semantics fares better to 
explain the interpretation of conditional inducements.  
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